In the span of a few years, two very different nations, Japan and Ukraine, have embarked on profound transformations of their military postures. On the surface their circumstances diverge: Japan, a wealthy, high-technology society deeply embedded in the American alliance system, contemplates a sweeping re-orientation of its defense policy; Ukraine, a country under direct assault, innovates with unmanned maritime weapons in a war for its survival. Yet when viewed side by side, their stories intersect in revealing ways. Both are grappling with threats that challenge long-standing paradigms, both are marrying new capabilities to changing strategic realities, and both are signalling that the future of military power will reflect not simply mass but agility, reach, and technological adaptation.
This article will examine these two trajectories in tandem. First, we will chart Japan’s major defence shift: its aim to double its defence budget to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, the plans for long-range strike systems, and the broader strategic implications for the Indo-Pacific. Then we will turn to Ukraine’s latest leap in naval drone capability, the upgraded “Sea Baby” unmanned surface vessel with extended range and heavy payload. Finally, we will draw out the linkages: what each case tells us about modern military trends, how conventional and asymmetric responses may coexist, and what that means for alliances, deterrence, and the future of conflict.
Japan’s Strategic Turning Point
A Post-War Paradigm Under Pressure
For decades, Japan’s self-defence posture was shaped by three pillars: the U.S.–Japan alliance, constitutional constraints (notably Article 9), and a general societal consensus favouring non-militarisation. The standard guideline for defence spending hovered in the region of 1 percent of GDP. In that sense, Japan’s current plans represent a tectonic shift.
Japan’s government has set a target of raising defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by fiscal year 2027. In concrete terms, Japan’s defence budget for fiscal year 2025 is projected at about ¥9.9 trillion (roughly US $69 billion).
The pressure behind this shift is clear: increasing regional threats, especially from China’s military build-up, the assertiveness of North Korea, and a changing U.S. strategic posture, have all prompted Tokyo to reassess.
From Defence to Deterrence: Long-Range Strike and Capability Expansion
But the change is not simply about scale. It is also about capability. Japan is moving beyond a purely defensive, or “self-defence,” orientation toward acquiring long-range strike systems, possibly for the first time in its post-war era. These systems are intended to deter regional threats by expanding Japan’s strike depth.
For example, Japan has reportedly signed agreements to purchase large numbers of long-range cruise missiles such as the U.S. Tomahawk to give its maritime self-defence forces a true “stand-off” capability. The planned five-year “Defence Buildup Programme” allocates roughly ¥43 trillion (≈ US $298 billion) for procurement, infrastructure, and force transformation through March 2028.
Japan’s leadership underscores that this is a response to “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.”
Alliance Dynamics, Domestic Politics and Strategic Implications
Any major shift of this kind has to be understood not only in capability terms but also in political and strategic terms.
Alliance framework. Japan remains firmly within the U.S. alliance structure. The upcoming meeting between Japan’s prime minister (in this narrative positioned as Takaichi Matsuko) and U.S. leadership underscores this. Tokyo is signalling that it will act more assertively in its own defence, but still in concert with Washington. That is key: the shift is not about Japan going it alone, but about recalibrating its role within a broader regional deterrence architecture.
Domestic dimension. For decades, Japan’s defence policy was constrained by constitutional pacifism and public sensitivity to militarisation. Moving to 2 percent of GDP and acquiring strike systems raises profound questions in Japanese public life about identity, history, and strategic autonomy. The government is also contemplating tax increases to fund this expansion.
Strategic and regional reactions. China, North Korea, and even Russia will take note. Japan increasing strike capacity and doing so explicitly shifts regional balances. It raises questions about escalation, about what counts as deterrence versus provocation, and about how other regional actors will respond (for example Australia, South Korea, Taiwan) and how China’s strategy will adjust.
Why This Matters: A Shift in the Indo-Pacific Order
Japan’s transformation matters for several reasons.
First, it weakens the long-held assumption that Japan will rely solely on U.S. extended deterrence and self‐defence only. With strike systems and higher budgets, Tokyo is signalling a more autonomous posture, albeit within allied frameworks.
Second, it complements broader trends in the Indo-Pacific: other nations are raising budgets, acquiring new capabilities including missile defences, long-range strike, and unmanned systems. Japan’s move gives greater momentum to a regional security re-ordering.
Third, it changes how potential adversaries calculate. If Japan acquires long-range strike, the threshold for deterrence may shift. Regional actors may need to reassess basing postures, escalation calculations, and maritime strategy.
In short, Japan’s shift is not just quantitative but qualitative: it alters Tokyo’s strategic identity, from pacifist hedger to more assertive actor.
Ukraine and the Rise of Naval Drones
War, Innovation and Asymmetry
For Ukraine, the situation is existential. Under full-scale invasion by Russia, Kyiv has had to improvise. One of its most striking innovations has been the deployment of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea. Among them, the Sea Baby has emerged as a potent symbol of how a smaller power can reshape a maritime theatre.
On 22 October 2025 the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) unveiled a new generation of Sea Baby drones with claimed range of 1,500 km and payload capacity of 2,000 kg. They display features such as automated machine-guns, rocket launchers, artificial intelligence targeting, and satellite or remote control.
These drones have been credited with strikes on Russian ships and port infrastructure, and even prompting a relocation of Russia’s Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.
Technical Leap and Operational Impact
Let’s unpack what’s notable.
Range and payload. The newer Sea Baby claims 1,500 km range, up from about 1,000 km in prior versions. Payload is claimed at up to 2,000 kg. These are very large numbers for unmanned surface vessels.
Armament and modularity. The drones are reported to carry multiple forms of weapon systems: machine-gun turrets, multiple-rocket launchers such as “Grad” systems, and possibly launch smaller aerial drones.
Operational effects. Ukrainian authorities claim the Sea Baby has already struck 11 Russian vessels since the start of the full-scale war. The strategic effect may be more important than the absolute counts: the mere threat of these drones has forced redeployment of Russian naval assets.
Innovation under pressure. Crucially, this is a case of wartime innovation: a country under pressure converting cost-effective unmanned systems into a strategic weapon. The Black Sea becomes a laboratory of drone warfare.
Implications for Naval Warfare and Asymmetry
What does this mean beyond the immediate theatre?
Naval coercion from below. Traditional naval power emphasises large capital ships, carrier groups, submarines, air power. Ukraine’s use of drones in the maritime domain suggests that smaller, unmanned platforms can impose cost and risk on larger sea forces, especially in constrained waters like the Black Sea. In that sense, the Sea Baby is a tool of naval asymmetry.
Disruption of maritime great-power assumptions. If a relatively weaker navy can force a stronger fleet to reposition, that challenges maritime power logics. Russia’s fleet had long been anchored in Sevastopol with relative dominance; the drone threat complicates that.
Technology amplifies geostrategic leverage. Ukraine’s ability to field long-range unmanned platforms gives it reach it previously lacked. Geography now matters differently: bottlenecks, ports, and logistic nodes become targets even when distant.
Export potential and future proliferation. The SBU’s statements hint at future export. If major or middle powers begin acquiring such naval drones, the sea-lane calculus could shift in littoral zones globally.
Limits and Challenges
Of course, the Sea Baby story is not without caveats.
Remote control and autonomy still face technological limits, especially in contested electromagnetic environments.
Payloads may be large on paper, but accuracy, weather, sea state, and counter-measures will complicate operations.
The geography of the Black Sea is constrained; the applicability of the model in open ocean theatres may differ.
Finally, Russia and other naval powers will develop counter-drone measures (jamming, active defence, swarm tactics) which will degrade the advantage over time.
Bridging the Two Stories: Threads and Contrasts
Shared Themes
Despite differences in wealth, threat environment, and geography, the Japanese and Ukrainian cases share common threads.
- Re-evaluation of strategic environment. Both countries face changed threats: Japan sees China and North Korea; Ukraine faces Russia. Both are responding not only to threat but to the perceived inadequacy of their previous posture.
- Emphasis on reach and depth. Japan’s acquisition of long-range strike systems and Ukraine’s 1,500 km drone range show that in modern defence thinking, simply localised defence is no longer sufficient.
- Technology as multiplier. For Ukraine, unmanned surface craft represent a tech multiplier. For Japan, advanced strike systems, procurement, and long-range missiles represent the same: capability beyond mere numbers.
- Shift in deterrence logic. Both reflect a shift from traditional deterrence (large armies, big ships) to deterrence through precision, reach, and surprise.
- Alliance and non-alliance implications. Japan tightens its alliance role; Ukraine uses global interest in its innovations to shape partner responses.
Contrasts That Illuminate
- Nature of power: Japan is a status-quo great power refining its posture; Ukraine is an embattled state innovating under fire.
- Pace and urgency: Ukraine’s evolution is dynamic, war-driven, immediate. Japan’s is strategic, slower, and involves domestic reforms, procurement cycles, and public legitimacy.
- Type of adaptation: Japan is expanding and modernising conventional capabilities. Ukraine emphasises disruption and asymmetric tools that invert conventional naval logics.
- Public attitudes and political constraints: Japan must navigate pacifist legacy, domestic debate, and alliance politics. Ukraine’s innovation is imperative rather than optional.
- Geostrategic setting: Indo-Pacific vs. Black Sea littoral; large ocean vs. constrained seas; multiple-actor region vs. one primary adversary.
What We Learn About Defence in the 21st Century
Reach matters more than ever
Long-range strike for Japan, long-range drones for Ukraine: distance is becoming a core component of deterrence and warfare. Geography still matters, but technological reach magnifies it.
Unmanned and unmanned-adjacent systems are multiplying the domain
Ukraine’s use of unmanned surface vessels shows that one can fight at sea without “ships” in the traditional sense. Japan’s procurement of striking missiles and possibly unmanned platforms shows the same trend in an advanced‐economy context.
The “defence-only” model is under pressure
Japan’s move away from purely defensive forces reflects the uncomfortable truth: border and island defence alone may not suffice when adversaries project from sea or air. Ukraine’s case shows that “defence” can mean striking far from one’s own shores. The line between defence and offence blurs.
Cost-effectiveness and innovation matter
Ukraine cannot match Russia ship-for-ship. Instead it innovates. Japan, though wealthy, recognises that procurement must emphasise quality, reach and integration with alliances. In both cases, spending more is only part of the equation; buying the right things matters.
Alliances and partnerships remain crucial
Japan’s shift reinforces the U.S. Japan alliance but also suggests Tokyo may take more initiative. Ukraine’s drone development draws not only on domestic innovation but global interest, funding flows, technology partnerships, and potential export relationships. Modern military posture is rarely solo.
Strategic signalling is as important as hardware
Japan’s budget announcements, its target of 2 percent GDP, its strike capability purchases all send messages to adversaries, allies, and domestic publics. Ukraine’s unveiling of Sea Baby upgrades similarly sends signalling: we can strike, we can innovate, we are not passive. The psychological dimension remains essential.
Strategic Implications: What Lies Ahead
For Japan and the Indo-Pacific
Japan’s elevation of defence spending to 2 percent of GDP and beyond, perhaps, is likely to provoke responses. China may adapt its maritime strategy, increase its own forces, or pressure Japan diplomatically. North Korea may perceive justification for its own nuclear posture.
Japan’s acquisition of longer-range strike systems could lead to a subtle rethinking of Japanese defence policy: bases farther forward, integration with U.S. missile-defence, more joint drills, perhaps a loosening of export control and more regional cooperation with Australia, India, Philippines, Taiwan.
The alliance framework may evolve. If Japan takes more initiative, then burden-sharing may change. The U.S. may require Japan to assume greater regional responsibility. That might trigger domestic debate, a factor Japan’s government must manage.
Regionally, smaller states will watch closely. Japan’s move may spur allied arms purchases, force posture adjustments (for example, in Australia or South Korea), and shift regional procurement baselines. The Indo-Pacific order may evolve toward higher baseline military spending, greater maritime strike density, and more unmanned systems.
For Ukraine and Maritime Warfare
Ukraine’s success with naval drones will not go unnoticed. Other littoral states, especially those with constrained navies but exposed coasts, will study the model. The cost-barrier to entry is shifting; relatively modest budgets may now produce strategic effect.
Russian naval calculations will have to adapt. Bases, ships and supply lines in the Black Sea must now factor unmanned threats. For the future, any navy operating in enclosed seas may face similar threats.
Unmanned maritime systems may proliferate. Export of platforms like Sea Baby, or their conceptual equivalents, will change naval architecture. We may see indigenous development of drone boat fleets, USV swarms, more autonomous systems.
Traditional big-ship navies will need to adjust: counter-unmanned tactics, sensors attuned to small craft, electronic warfare resilience, layered defence of ports and anchorages. The era of “invulnerable” naval bastions may be over in certain contexts.
Intersection: Allies, Exports, and Risk of Competition
One of the most interesting intersections of the Japan and Ukraine stories lies in export and alliance dynamics.
Japan may increasingly export defence equipment, collaborate more deeply with allies, and possibly join in forward basing of unmanned systems in the region. Meanwhile, Ukraine could become a pioneer and exporter of naval drone systems. This raises questions: will Japan or other U.S. allies seek to acquire such naval drones? Could the Indo-Pacific see unmanned maritime platforms drawn from Ukraine-style innovation? Will China move to counter-develop similar systems?
Moreover, the risk of inadvertent escalation increases. As more states acquire long-range strike and unmanned systems, the margin for miscalculation narrows. For example, drones misidentify targets, long-range missiles cross boundaries, alliances draw in third parties. The structural rise in reach and autonomy raises complexity.
A Future in Which Defence Budgets Expand and Technology Matters
If Japan successfully reaches its 2 percent GDP target and mass-procures long-range strike and unmanned platforms, then defence budgets in the Indo-Pacific will ratchet upward. That may create a new baseline, an arms race in slow motion, driven by tech rather than numbers.
In Ukraine, continued drone innovation will push other states to invest in similar, cheaper platforms or counter-platforms. Thus, the maritime domain may see a transformation: from large, manned, capital-rich assets to a layered network of unmanned, autonomous (or semi-autonomous) systems.
This means that mid-sized powers will have greater leverage. Whereas once naval power required carriers, destroyers and massive budgets, now drones and long-range strike redefine what is possible. Japan’s decision to expand its defence posture may then be seen not only as conventional force-upgrading but as anticipating this shift.
Reflections and Practical Insight
In combining the stories of Japan and Ukraine, three final reflections emerge.
First, strategic adaptation is inevitable. Neither Japan nor Ukraine had the luxury of maintaining status-quo forces with confidence that the threat environment would remain stable. Japan recognised that decades of low defence spending and limited strike options no longer aligned with its strategic reality. Ukraine recognised that it could not match Russia ship-for-ship, so it innovated. The lesson: nations that stick rigidly to legacy force-structures risk strategic obsolescence.
Second, technology is multiplying choices. For a long time, deterrence and warfare were about “size matters”: bigger navy, more missiles, larger army. Today, reach, autonomy, networked platforms and unmanned systems shape the calculus. Ukraine’s Sea Baby is a striking example. Japan is also buying into long-range missiles and presumably unmanned capabilities. The future of force-projection may be less about bulk, more about precision, connectivity, and adaptability.
Third, alliances and partnerships matter more but look different. Japan is boosting its role within the U.S. alliance but also signalling more autonomy. Ukraine is innovating domestically but drawing attention (and possibly support) globally. In both cases, technology integration, procurement chains, interoperability and export potential are key. Modern defence is not simply national, it is networked.
For policy-makers in allied states: invest not just in more hardware but in platforms with greater reach, autonomy, flexibility. Look at how drones and long-range strike are re-defining threat environments, and plan for counter-measures as much as capabilities.
For those in smaller states: the Ukraine model offers hope that innovation and asymmetry can offset bigger adversaries. Think about how unmanned systems, long-reach strike and niche capabilities can shift local balances of power.
For strategic thinkers: recognise that budgets alone tell only part of the story. It is how that budget is used, for capabilities that change geography, that increase reach or that shift the qualitative nature of warfare, that matters. Japan’s jump to 2 percent of GDP is notable, but what matters even more is how those funds are allocated
For continental powers and navies: the maritime domain is evolving. Bases and large ships remain important but so do unmanned platforms, small craft with heavy punch, and long-range strike from unexpected vectors. The era of uncontested naval superiority may be narrowing in littoral zones.
Conclusion
Japan’s choice to double its defence spending to 2 percent of GDP and acquire long-range strike systems marks a historic strategic shift. For a nation long defined by Defence-Only posture and pacifist constraints, this represents both a break from the past and a leap into a more assertive role in the Indo-Pacific. Simultaneously, Ukraine’s rapid maturation of the Sea Baby unmanned surface vessel epitomises how technology, necessity and innovation combine to bend maritime strategy: a country under siege mastering drone warfare on the sea and forcing even a larger navy to reposition.
Viewed together, the two stories illustrate how modern military evolution is shaped by two powerful currents: the rise of reach (how far one can strike or defend) and the rise of autonomy (how unmanned systems change the nature of force). They reinforce the idea that defence matters not just for how much is spent, but for how wisely and creatively it is spent. For students of strategy, these cases provide a compelling contrast: a wealthy state upgrading conventional deterrence; an embattled state innovating asymmetric power. Yet both converge in showing that the future of warfare is being written now, by those willing to rethink legacy models, leverage technology and act from the strong assumption that tomorrow will not look like yesterday.
In practical terms, this means that we should pay as much attention to what kind of capabilities states are acquiring as how much they are spending. It means that alliances will evolve not only in size but in posture and roles. And it means that for defence professionals and citizens alike, the question is no longer whether states should have strong militaries, but whether their militaries are fit for a rapidly changing strategic landscape.
And if there is one final thought it is this: in a world where distance is shrinking through reach and where unmanned systems lower the barrier to strategic effect, the premium falls on adaptation. Japan and Ukraine are adjusting to that. How much the rest of us learn from their example remains the real question.